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There is a view, voiced perhaps more frequently in conversation than 
in print, that the best explanation of the basis of liability in the law of 
torts is a divided one. For simplicity I will call it the “Standard View”.1 
The Standard View begins with the observation that there are two kinds 
or classes of torts: the intentional torts, which are actionable per se, and 
those torts that require proof of harm or loss before a finding of liability 
will be made. Included in this latter class are the torts of negligence and, 
arguably, nuisance. With this distinction in place, the Standard View 
draws a further distinction between two models of liability. Thus, 
according to the Standard View the model of liability that best explains 
the intentional torts is based on interferences with rights, while the model 
that best explains the so-called harm-based torts is based on the culpable 
causation of loss. On the Standard View, then, the law of torts is 
bifurcated both in theory and in practice: it comprises two distinct classes 
of torts, and embraces two distinct models of liability.
2
  
                                                                                                                                  
*  University of Western Ontario. I would like to thank Jason Neyers for very helpful 
comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this paper.  
1  Throughout this paper I will do my best to talk about the law of torts (plural), rather than 
tort law (singular). This is because this area of private law seems to be a collection of individual 
causes of action, or wrongs — assault, battery, trespass, conversion, defamation, negligence, 
inducing breach of contract, false imprisonment, and so on. Thus, even though I will be arguing that 
there is something that these causes of action have in common — all involve violations of so-called 
primary rights — referring to this area of law as the law of torts reminds us that to be subject to a tort 
is to be wronged, and that there are different ways that a person’s primary rights can be interfered 
with. For a similar view see Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), at 2: “we have a law of torts (plural) not a law of tort, just as we have a law of wrongs not a 
law of wrong” [hereinafter “Stevens, Torts and Rights”].  
2  The bifurcation identified by the Standard View is by no means a modern invention: the 
ancient writs of trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case capture more or less the same 
distinction. For discussion, see c. 17 of S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
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There is something compelling about the Standard View. We often 
distinguish the harm-based torts from the intentional or trespassory torts, 
and when introducing the law of torts to students we are often at pains to 
emphasize the doctrinal dissimilarities between these different areas of 
liability.
3
 Trespass involves strict liability, we say (you can commit 
trespass accidentally) and can be committed without causing harm — if 
I take a nap in your bed while you are at work, bringing along my own 
sheets and pillow-case and cleaning up after I leave, I am liable in trespass 
even though you have not suffered harm in any obvious sense
4
 — while 
negligence requires proof of carelessness and is subject to a “no harm, no 
foul” principle. Moreover, it is a very short step from the identification of 
these doctrinal dissimilarities to the assertion of underlying normative 
differences. By this I mean that it is very natural to conclude that, given 
the doctrinal differences between the intentional torts and the harm-based 
torts, their underlying bases of liability must differ as well. For if harm is 
a necessary condition for liability in negligence, but not in assault, is this 
not sufficient to establish that the nature of liability in the two cases must 
be fundamentally different as well? 
The Standard View therefore offers a prima facie plausible 
interpretation of both doctrine and theory in the law of torts. 
Nonetheless, I want to argue that the Standard View is wrong. But 
showing that it is wrong, and perhaps more importantly, why it is wrong, 
takes some doing. Broadly speaking, there are two ways to challenge the 
Standard View. One could take issue with the Standard View’s claim that 
there are, as a matter of positive law, two distinct classes or kinds of 
torts. But it seems to me that this would be difficult to do since on their 
face battery and negligence are, or involve, different kinds of wrongs. 
Alternatively, one could take issue with the Standard View’s claim that 
there are, as a matter of normative theory, two distinct accounts of the 
basis of liability in the law of torts. I will pursue the second strategy here. 
First, I will argue that the Standard View’s account of the basis of 
liability for harm-based torts is inadequate and that another view, which I 
call the “Rights Model”, offers a better explanation. By this I mean that 
                                                                                                                                  
3  By trespassory torts I have in mind both trespasses to person — assault and battery, for 
example — and trespasses to property, such as simple trespass and conversion.  
4  See, e.g., The Mediana, [1900] A.C. 113, at 117 (H.L.), per Lord Halsbury: 
“Supposing a person took away a chair out of my room and kept it for twelve months, could 
anybody say you had a right to diminish the damages by showing that I do not usually sit in that 
chair, or that there were plenty of other chairs in the room? The proposition so nakedly stated 
appears to me to be absurd[.]”  
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that the Rights Model is simpler, more coherent, and gives a better 
explanation of the cases than does the Standard View.
5
 And second, I will 
suggest that once we recognize that the key concept in the law of torts is 
not culpable causation of loss but is instead the rectification of wrongs, 
we will see that negligence law, despite its requirement of harm, 
nonetheless sits conformably with the intentional torts. What makes the 
law of torts hang together is its emphasis on rights and corresponding 
duties; what threatens to pull it apart is an undue focus on harm, loss, and 
compensation. I will argue, in short, that the presence of two different 
classes or kinds of torts should not lead us to embrace two distinct 
models or modes of liability.  
To be clear, I am not arguing that the concepts of compensation and 
loss are practically unimportant for the law of torts; they are not. 
Certainly for a plaintiff who has suffered physical injury at the hands of a 
negligent defendant, has had his or her reputation defamed, or has had 
property damaged or destroyed, compensation in the form of monetary 
damages are integral to making the plaintiff whole. All the same, I worry 
that in thinking about the law of torts an undue focus on the role played 
by the concepts of compensation and loss has distorted how we reason 
about the nature of tort liability, and that this distortion has had 
detrimental effects on how this area of law has been developed by 
judges, lawyers and academics.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin by expanding on the 
Standard View’s account of the basis of liability in negligence and 
nuisance, contrasting it with the account of liability offered by the Rights 
Model. Next, I argue that although the Rights Model was explicit in the 
Canadian law of torts for a very long time it has recently become 
displaced by the Standard View. But I also argue that in order to sustain 
itself the Standard View must, and in fact does, appeal to the very 
concepts and distinctions that are constitutive of the Rights Model. 
I draw two conclusions from this, one interpretive, one prescriptive. The 
interpretive conclusion is that the best interpretation of the Canadian law 
of torts is one according to which liability is based on general principles 
involving rights and duties. The prescriptive conclusion is that this is the 
only interpretive conclusion that makes sense: a law of torts that based 
liability only on the concepts of fault and damage would, for that very 
reason, be a deficient one.  
                                                                                                                                  
5  For further discussion of the notion of coherence see Jason Neyers, “A Coherent Law of 
Estoppel?” (2003) 2 J. Obligations & Remedies 25. 
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II. TWO VIEWS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 
The preceding discussion is obviously sketchy and incomplete. All 
the same, it serves to identify the key point of disagreement between the 
Standard View and the Rights Model. In brief, the main point of 
disagreement between the two approaches has to do with the account of 
liability that is appropriate for the so-called harm-based torts. Both 
approaches agree, in other words, that with respect to the intentional 
torts, considerations having to do with harm, loss, or damage are largely 
irrelevant to questions of liability — while harm is sometimes relevant to 
remedial issues it is not a constitutive element of the cause of action in 
trespass or battery. Rather, what divides friends of the Standard View and 
friends of the Rights Model has to do with what account best explains the 
nature of liability for torts, such as negligence, that require proof of harm 
before liability will be imposed. Proponents of the Standard View — not 
implausibly — say that the best account is one that is based on 
considerations having to do with fault and loss, while proponents of the 
Rights Model insist that it is an account based in the first instance on 
rights and duties. Who is correct? It is to this question that I now turn.  
1.  The Standard View 
As I noted above, the Standard View distinguishes two accounts of 
liability, and suggests that while the model of liability that explains the 
intentional torts is based on interferences with rights, the model that best 
explains the so-called harm-based torts is based on the culpable causation 
of loss. Let me discuss this second idea in a bit more detail.  
The general principle animating this second idea is that there ought 
to be liability for all injuries, subject to exceptions. According to this 
principle, once damage has occurred as a result of the defendant’s 
objectionable conduct, liability ought to be imposed on the defendant 
unless there is a good reason not to do so. To be sure, what constitutes 
“objectionable conduct” will vary from situation to situation, and from 
tort to tort. In some situations, such as those involving trespass to persons 
or property, conduct will be objectionable if it is intentional, while in 
other contexts, conduct will be objectionable if it is reckless or careless, 
as in negligence. Still, the idea that liability ought to be based on 
culpability together with loss is easy enough to understand. So, for 
example, in Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship 
Co., McLachlin J. (as she then was) said that “[a] fundamental 
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proposition underlies the law of tort: that a person who by his or her fault 
causes damage to another may be held responsible.”6 This proposition or 
idea goes by many names. Allan Beever calls it the “common law 
conception of tort”.7 Jason Neyers calls it the “modern approach” to tort 
law.
8
 And Robert Stevens simply calls it the “loss model” of tort law.9 In 
what follows I will call it the “Culpable Causation of Loss Model”, or the 
“CCL Model” for short.  
Regardless of what it is called, however, what is characteristic about 
this model is a particular view about the nature of liability appropriate for 
harm-based torts. According to Beever: 
There are two parts to this conception. The first part consists of a 
general principle, according to which persons are responsible for the 
injuries they cause others. The second part holds that the strict 
application of this principle would lead to overly extensive liability and 
so the principle must, for reasons of broad social and economic policy, 
be accompanied by a long list of exceptions.
10
 
As Neyers summarizes the view: 
First, one determines if, according to the generalised legal rules, the 
behaviour of the defendant was wrongful and caused loss (i.e., if there 
was fault plus causation of loss). In the case of negligence, this would 
mean determining whether the defendant behaved negligently and 
thereby caused reasonably foreseeable injury to the claimant ... . If one 
reaches a positive conclusion on the first step, then at the second step 
one asks whether there are any policy reasons “which ought to 
negative, or to reduce or limit” this liability.11 
And as Stevens succinctly puts it, what characterizes the CCL is the 
idea that “the defendant should be liable where he is at fault for causing 
the claimant loss unless there is a good reason why not”.12  
                                                                                                                                  
6  Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] S.C.J. No. 40, 
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021, at 1137 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Norsk”]. 
7  Allan Beever, “Justice and Punishment in Tort” in Charles Rickett, ed., Justifying Private 
Law Remedies (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), at 249. See also Allan Beever, Rediscovering the 
Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
8  Jason Neyers, “Tate & Lyle Food & Distribution Ltd. v. Greater London Council (1983)” 
[hereinafter “Neyers”] in Charles Mitchell & Paul Mitchell, eds., Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), at 227. 
9  Stevens, Torts and Rights, supra, note 1, at 1. 
10  Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 
at 272. 
11  Neyers, supra, note 8, at 234-35. 
12  Stevens, Torts and Rights, supra, note 1, at 1. 
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In short, according to the CCL Model all harms or losses culpably 
caused by the objectionable conduct of others are presumptively 
unlawful. Thus, where as a result of wrongful conduct there has been 
foreseeable causation of harm or loss what needs justification on the 
CCL Model is not, as one might expect, the imposition of liability. 
Rather, what needs justification is the failure to impose liability. 
According to the CCL, in other words, if A harms B but does not owe B 
compensation, that can only be because of the presence of other factors 
that negate the imposition of liability on A. What might such other 
factors be? Potential candidates include the fact that imposing liability 
would carry with it a spectre of indeterminate or unlimited liability;
13
 that 
imposing liability would encourage moral hazard, i.e., careless or risky 
behaviour; that the plaintiff was best placed to insure against the loss; the 
presence of residual economic policy concerns; and so on.
14
 
Although I will criticize the CCL Model in what follows — and, by 
extension, the Standard View — it is worth pausing to note that there are 
reasons to take the model seriously. This is because it is natural to think 
that, other things being equal, when a defendant acts in an objectionable 
manner and causes harm or loss to another individual, that defendant 
ought to be held responsible for the damage that he or she has brought 
about. Thus, suppose D by his objectionable conduct causes foreseeable 
damage or loss to P. Since the loss has already occurred, the only 
question is whether to let the loss lie where it falls, or to shift it from P to 
another party. But according to our ordinary intuitions, as between D, 
who has acted badly and caused the loss, and the innocent plaintiff P who 
has suffered the loss, surely the loss ought to be shifted (or “spread”, or 
distributed, as it is sometimes said) from P to D; for had D not acted 
badly in the first place P would not have suffered the loss in question. In 
other words, it is very natural to think that where we have fault together 
with loss, there are strong reasons to impose liability on the individual 
who caused the loss in question. Or as Jules Coleman has said: “[t]ort 
                                                                                                                                  
13  As suggested by a superficial reading of Cardozo J.’s judgment in Ultramares v. Touche, 
174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. C.A. 1931) [hereinafter “Ultramares”]. 
14  Jane Stapleton has identified no fewer than 50 factors that might be appealed to at the 
duty of care stage in a negligence inquiry in order to support or negate the imposition of liability. 
See Jane Stapleton, “Duty of Care Factors: a Selection from the Judicial Menus” in Peter Cane & 
Jane Stapleton, eds., The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), at 59. 
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law is about messes. A mess has been made, and the only question before 
the Court is, who is to clean it up?”15 
2.  The Rights Model 
Now contrast the CCL Model with what I will call, following a 
number of other authors, the Rights Model.
16
 According to an 
interpretation of the Rights Model that I find attractive, the law of torts 
serves to set fair terms of interaction between individuals. It does this in 
the first instance by assigning primary rights to individuals, and in the 
second instance, by giving legal effect to secondary rights of repair. Let 
me explain. A primary right is a right that is recognized by substantive 
legal doctrine, and that exists prior to the wrong complained of.
17
 
Examples of primary rights include the right to bodily autonomy, the 
right to bodily integrity, and rights to real property and chattels.
18
 
A secondary right is a right that arises when a primary right is violated. 
So, for example, if I negligently hit you with my car and break your leg, 
I have violated your primary right to bodily integrity. The violation of 
                                                                                                                                  
15  Jules Coleman, “Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions” in Brian Bix, ed., 
Analyzing Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 257, at 302.  
16  For articulation and discussion of the Rights Model see, among others, Stevens, Torts and 
Rights, supra, note 1; Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2007) [hereinafter “Beever”]; George Fletcher, “Fairness and Utility in Tort Law” (1972) 85 Harv. 
L. Rev. 537; Jules Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
Gregory Keating, “Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory” (1995-1996) 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 311; John Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, “Torts as Wrongs” (2010) 88 Tex. L. Rev. 917; 
John Gardner, “What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30:1 Law & 
Phil. 1; Nicholas McBride, “Rights and the Basis of Tort Law” in D. Nolan & A. Robertson, eds., 
Rights and Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), at 331; Arthur Ripstein, Equality, 
Responsibility, and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), “Philosophy of Tort 
Law” in J. Coleman & S. Shapiro, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Legal 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), and “As If It Had Never Happened” (2007) 48 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1957; and Ernest Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) [hereinafter “Weinrib, Private Law”] and Corrective Justice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012) [hereinafter Weinrib, Corrective Justice”]. 
17  For discussion see Peter Birks, “The Concept of a Civil Wrong” in D. Owen, ed., 
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 29, at 38ff. See 
also, and again, Beever, id. and Stevens, Torts and Rights, id. It is an interesting question what, 
exactly, the relation between primary rights and secondary rights is. Are they distinct rights? Is the 
secondary right merely the primary right in another guise? I set this interesting and important issue 
aside, since it is not relevant to the present discussion.  
18  For simplicity I am assuming that it makes sense to talk about a right to bodily integrity 
and autonomy. Some would object to this by saying instead that you have a right that your bodily 
integrity not be intentionally or negligently interfered with. I take no stand on this issue here, since 
the argument of the paper goes through regardless of how primary rights are understood.  
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your primary right, however, gives rise to a secondary right, and that 
corresponds to a secondary, or remedial, obligation on my part to make it 
as if the violation of your primary right had never occurred. This is 
typically done by a payment of monetary damages. What is of particular 
importance on the Rights Model is the necessity of identifying a primary 
right held by the plaintiff, and exigible against the defendant, that the 
defendant’s allegedly objectionable conduct is said to have violated. If no 
primary right is violated, either because no primary right can be 
identified, or because the defendant’s conduct was not objectionable in 
the relevant sense, then the defendant should not be held liable for the 
damage suffered by the plaintiff for the simple reason that the defendant 
has not done anything that he or she was not entitled to do.  
It should be clear enough why there should be no liability when no 
primary right exists. After all, if I have no primary right that you not 
behave in a particular way, I cannot complain when you do behave in 
that way. But what does it mean to say that the defendant should be 
absolved from liability when his or her conduct was not objectionable in 
the relevant sense? For an example of such conduct, consider Palsgraf v. 
Long Island Railway Co.
19
 The plaintiff in Palsgraf was standing on a 
railway platform when a train stopped at the station. A man carrying a 
package tried to jump aboard the train, a guard on the platform pushed 
him from behind, and as a result the man’s package fell. As it turned out, 
the package contained fireworks, and when the package fell the 
fireworks exploded, causing some scales at the other end of the platform 
to fall on the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the railway company in 
negligence, arguing that it was under an obligation to ensure that she was 
not injured by the negligent conduct of its employees. In his reasons 
denying recovery Cardozo J. said the following: “The conduct of the 
defendant’s guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, 
was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. 
Relatively to her it was not negligence at all.”20 According to Cardozo J., 
in other words, even if it was accepted that the guard’s conduct in 
pushing the passenger onto the train and dislodging the package was 
objectionable — i.e., careless — it did not follow that the guard’s 
conduct was objectionable in relation to the plaintiff since the defendant 
was under no duty to guard against the kind of injury suffered by the 
                                                                                                                                  
19  248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. CA 1928) [hereinafter “Palsgraf”]. See also Bourhill v. 
Young, [1943] A.C. 92 (H.L.). 
20  Palsgraf, id., at 99. 
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plaintiff. Again, although the conduct of the defendant’s guard might 
have been negligent in relation to the passenger who was pushed, “in its 
relation to the plaintiff, standing far away … it was not negligence at 
all.” And why not? Because the guard did not owe her a duty of care. 
Said Cardozo J.: “the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to 
be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others 
within the range of apprehension …”.21 What made the conduct of the 
defendant’s guard objectionable were the risks it imposed on the 
passenger and his property. What did not make the conduct objectionable 
were the risks — if any — it imposed on the plaintiff. Consequently, the 
guard was under no duty of care with respect to her. The guard’s conduct 
could not constitute a violation of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff 
because the injury that the plaintiff suffered was not within the ambit of 
the risk — or in Cardozo J.’s language, within “the range of 
apprehension” — created by the guard’s objectionable conduct. To 
reiterate, what made it objectionable for the guard to push the passenger 
onto the train was that in doing so the passenger might be injured, or his 
property damaged. What did not make it objectionable was the 
possibility that due to the unforeseeable contents of the package that was 
dislodged, a passenger standing at the other end of the platform might 
suffer injury.
22
 This is what it means to say that the defendant’s conduct 
might not be objectionable in the relevant sense. 
There are a number of different ways to articulate and explain the 
Rights Model, but let me try to do so in as theoretically neutral a way as 
possible. The simplest way to make sense of the Rights Model is to begin 
by thinking about the manner in which individuals ought, ideally, to  
 
                                                                                                                                  
21  Id., at 100. 
22  Palsgraf is often held up as a case where liability was denied on the basis of proximate 
cause or remoteness — this on the grounds that the plaintiff’s injury was too remote from the 
guard’s careless conduct. So, for example, Saul Levmore begins his discussion of Palsgraf in his 
otherwise excellent “The Wagon Mound Cases: Foreseeability, Causation, and Mrs. Palsgraf”, his 
contribution to R. Rabin & S. Sugarman, eds., Torts Stories (New York: Foundation Press, 2003), at 129, 
as follows: “Consider now that most famous of all causation cases, Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail 
Road …”. But this view of Palsgraf is surely wrong. It clearly was not the view of Cardozo J., who 
explicitly said that “[t]he law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before 
us” (Palsgraf, id., at 101). Rather, and for the reasons given above, Palsgraf is a duty of care case. 
For further defence and elaboration of the duty of care interpretation of Palsgraf see, e.g., Weinrib, 
Private Law, supra, note 16, c. 6 and Corrective Justice, supra, note 16, c. 2 “The Disintegration 
of Duty”. 
144 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015), 69 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
interact with one another in a modern society.
23
 It is tautological, but true 
nonetheless, that in a modern society individuals ought to treat each other 
with respect. To treat individuals with respect involves, at a minimum, 
taking the interests of those individuals into account when acting, and 
doing one’s best to act in a way that others would accept. In Political 
Liberalism
24
 John Rawls drew a distinction between the rational and the 
reasonable. According to Rawls, reasonable persons “desire for its own 
sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with 
others on terms all can accept”.25 Rational persons, on the other hand, 
lack “the desire to engage in fair cooperation as such, and to do so on 
terms that others as equals might reasonably be expected to endorse”.26 
In short, a rational person acts in order to further his or her own ends, 
whatever they may be, asking how he or she ought to behave given the 
ends that he or she in fact has. A reasonable person, to the contrary, acts 
in a manner that recognizes the freedom of others: a reasonable person 
asks him- or herself what he or she should do given the ends that he or 
she in fact has measured against the competing interests of others, and 
given his or her desire to interact with others on terms all can accept.  
So we have a distinction between two ways of interacting with 
others. We can engage with others in a (purely) rational manner, which 
involves treating others as things to be used or manipulated in pursuit of 
one’s own goals or ends. Or we can engage with others in a reasonable 
manner, by taking their interests into account when considering what it 
would be appropriate for us to do. It is implicit in the Rights Model that 
individuals ought to act in a reasonable manner, and that when things go 
wrong it is the reasonableness of one’s conduct that is often of crucial 
importance in determining the scope of one’s liability.  
But this picture gives rise to an obvious question, namely: what is to 
count as an appropriate limit on my freedom, or an appropriate limit on 
yours? I said earlier that on the Rights view we have primary rights, the 
violation of which give rise to secondary rights to repair. My suggestion 
is that the assignment of primary rights is one way in which the law sets 
                                                                                                                                  
23  What follows owes much to George Fletcher, “Fairness and Utility in Tort Law” (1972) 
85 Harv. L. Rev. 537; Gregory Keating, “Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory” 
(1995-1996) 48 Stan. L. Rev. 311; and Arthur Ripstein, “The Division of Responsibility and the Law 
of Tort” (2004) 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1811, and Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
24  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
25  Id., at 50. 
26  Id., at 51. 
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reasonable, or fair, terms of interaction between individuals. In other 
words, the law recognizes a primary right to bodily integrity to ensure 
that in the exercise of their freedom others cannot interfere with my 
body; and the law recognizes a primary right to autonomy to ensure that 
in the exercise of their freedom others cannot interfere with my ability to 
choose the ends to which my means may be put. Or more simply: the law 
recognizes primary rights in order to ensure that others do not get to tell 
me what to do with myself or my things. Consider in this respect the 
primary right to bodily autonomy: why does the law protect that right? 
The answer is surely that the body is the medium through which 
individuals act in and on the world; consequently, to be limited in what 
one can do with one’s body by the arbitrary actions or choices of others 
is to have one’s freedom unfairly diminished. This is not the same, 
however, as saying that to be limited in what one can do with one’s body 
is to have one’s freedom diminished. For it may be that my freedom must 
be curtailed in order to render it consistent with the freedom of others. 
But that is not a diminishment of my freedom, since on the present view 
I was never entitled to freedom inconsistent with the equal freedom of 
others. If you take the last apple from the supermarket shelf, I am limited 
in what I can do: I cannot, for example, eat that apple for lunch. But that 
is not a diminishment of my freedom since I was never entitled to the 
apple to begin with. And if I lock my front door at night, you are again 
limited in what you can do: you cannot enter my house. But it would be 
odd to say that your freedom is thereby diminished given that you had no 
right to enter my house without my permission in the first place. 
Now, of course, it sometimes happens that my freedom is interfered 
with. Sometimes, that is, others interfere with my bodily integrity, as 
when they punch me on the nose (battery), or lead me to believe that they 
will punch me on the nose (assault), or carelessly hit me with their car 
(negligence). Sometimes others interfere with my autonomy, as when 
they wrongfully confine me (false imprisonment). And sometimes others 
interfere with my property, as when they enter my home without my 
permission (trespass), take something that belongs to me and use it for 
their own purposes (conversion), or behave in a manner that substantially 
interferes with the use or enjoyment of my property (nuisance). In cases 
such as these — that is, in cases where a primary right is interfered 
with — the law will recognize a secondary right to repair and allow the 
plaintiff to sue for damages or an injunction. This is what I will call the 
Rights Model. 
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To repeat: what is central to the Rights Model is the idea that before 
liability can be imposed on a defendant a plaintiff must point to a 
primary right that the defendant’s objectionable conduct has interfered 
with. By way of illustration, consider Bradford v. Pickles.
27
 The town of 
Bradford received a significant amount of its municipal water from a 
natural spring that flowed underneath the defendant’s land. The 
defendant proceeded to divert the water from the spring for work on his 
own land (although the hunch was that his true motive was to encourage 
the town to either purchase his land or pay him to refrain from interfering 
with the flow of water from the natural spring). The result was that less 
water flowed to the town, and the town sought an injunction to prevent 
the defendant from continuing his water-diverting activities. The 
injunction, however, was denied. Why? Because despite the harm 
suffered by the town, there was no primary right that the defendant’s 
conduct violated: there was nothing that the defendant acquired to which 
the town could point and say, that is ours. Here, then, was a case in 
which harm was foreseeably caused, but in which no liability was 
imposed. And the reason why liability was not imposed was because 
there was nothing that Pickles had done that he was not legally entitled to 
do. As Lord Halsbury put it, “if the owner of the adjoining land is in a 
situation in which an act of his, lawfully done on his own land, may 
divert the water which would otherwise go into the possession of [the 
town], I see no reason why he should not insist on their purchasing his 
interest from which [the town] desires to make profit.”28 In short, 
Bradford stands for the following proposition: if there has been no 
violation of a primary right, there can be no liability; or, equivalently, if 
there is liability, there must have been a violation of a primary right. 
To be sure, the reception of Bradford in Canada has not been 
uniformly positive, and several cases indicate that the principle suggested 
by Bradford, that property owners are entitled to unrestricted use of their 
property, ought to be applied “cautiously”. For example, in Pugliese v. 
National Capital Commission,
29
 Howland J.A. said that “[t]o conclude 
that those who abstract percolating water have unbridled licence to wreak 
havoc on their neighbours would be harsh and entirely out of keeping 
                                                                                                                                  
27  [1895] A.C. 587 (H.L.) [hereinafter “Bradford”]. 
28  Id., at 595. 
29  [1977] O.J. No. 2370, 79 D.L.R. (3d) 592 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1979] S.C.J. No. 34, [1979] 
2 S.C.R. 104 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pugliese”]. 
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with the law of torts as it exists today.”30 Indeed it would, but that is not 
the principle for which Bradford stands. Bradford does not say that 
property owners have unbridled licence to use their property as they see 
fit. Rather, it stands for the proposition that property owners are entitled 
to use their property as they see fit provided that its use does not violate 
the primary rights of anyone else.  
In this respect the situation in Bradford was importantly different 
from the situation in Pugliese. There the Regional Municipality of 
Ottawa-Carleton (“RMOC”), with the consent of the National Capital 
Commission (“NCC”), entered into an agreement with two private 
contractors, B and C, to construct a collection sewer on lands owned by 
the NCC. Unfortunately, the total amount of water pumped by B and C 
greatly exceeded the daily maximum permitted under the relevant 
sections of the Ontario Water Resources Act.
31
 Moreover, it was 
undisputed that B and C’s diversion of water resulted in physical damage 
to the plaintiff’s property, including severe cracking and faulting to the 
floors, foundations, walls, ceilings and fireplaces of the residential 
structures, and cracking to curbs, laneways, sidewalks and landings. This 
was because the dewatering served to undermine the land on which the 
plaintiff’s properties were built. From a factual point of view, then, the 
two cases differ: in Bradford there was loss, but no physical damage, 
while in Pugliese the plaintiffs could point to significant physical harm to 
their property. But from a doctrinal point of view the two cases are 
indistinguishable, since among the primary rights enjoyed by residential 
property owners is the right that the negligent conduct of others not cause 
physical damage to their property. Had that right not been violated in 
Pugliese, liability would not have been imposed.
32
 
Other cases illustrate the converse of this proposition, viz., that if 
there has been a violation of a primary right, there can or will be liability 
even in the absence of loss. For example, in Edwards v. Lee’s 
Administrator
33
 the defendant invited tourists to explore caves under his 
property and in so doing led them underground to caves located under 
the plaintiff’s property. Because the only entrance to the plaintiff’s caves 
was located on the defendant’s property, the plaintiff had no way to 
                                                                                                                                  
30  Id., at 615. 
31  R.S.O. 1970, c. 332. 
32  For further discussion see Quality Woodwork Ltd. v. Vet’s Trucking and Cartage Ltd., 
[1992] N.B.J. No. 100, 122 N.B.R. (2d) 251 (N.B.C.A.). 
33  96 S.W.2d 1028 (Kentucky C.A. 1936) [hereinafter “Edwards”]. See also Stewart Estate 
v. TAQA North Ltd., [2013] A.J. No. 1310, 2013 ABQB 691, at para. 640 (Alta. Q.B.). 
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exploit the caves to his own advantage. Nonetheless, the Court concluded 
that in using the caves without the plaintiff’s consent the defendant was 
required to disgorge his profits. The reason is simple: because the caves 
belonged to the plaintiff, the defendant’s unauthorized use of those caves 
was inconsistent with the plaintiff’s ownership of them, and any gains 
realized by that use were owed to the plaintiff.  
Similarly, in Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.
34
 
the plaintiff and defendant 
had been co-owners of an egg business. The plaintiff eventually sold his 
interest in the business to the defendant. Not included in the sale was an 
egg-washing machine; rather, the plaintiff retained ownership of the 
machine and stored it on its property, which was located next to the 
defendant’s property. Sometime after the sale of the business, however, 
the defendant, without discussion or consent, took the machine out of 
storage and used it about once a week for three years. While it was 
accepted that the plaintiff — who had in fact forgotten about the 
machine — would not have used the machine in those three years, the 
Court nonetheless held that the defendant was liable. Again, the natural 
explanation is not that the plaintiff suffered loss but rather that the 
defendant’s liability flowed from the fact that the plaintiff was the only 
one who was entitled to determine the purposes to which the machine 
should be put. In using the machine without the plaintiff’s consent, the 
defendant was violating the plaintiff’s primary right to the machine, and 
so was required to pay an amount equivalent to the amount of money it 
saved by using the machine and not having to pay labourers to wash the 
eggs by hand. 
Together, Bradford, Edwards, and Olwell yield the following 
biconditional: liability will be imposed on a defendant if and only if the 
defendant’s conduct violated a primary right held by the plaintiff. I take 
this to be at the core of the Rights Model’s account of liability in the law 
of torts.  
Let me summarize the argument to this point. I have described two 
models of liability for harm-based torts such as negligence and nuisance. 
One model — the Culpable Causation of Loss Model — is based on the 
principle that all culpably caused losses are presumptively wrongful. It 
therefore imposes liability unless reasons can be found for not doing so. 
The other model — the Rights Model — is based on the principle that 
even where there has been the culpable causation of loss no liability 
                                                                                                                                  
34  173 P.2d 652 (Wash. S.C. 1946) [hereinafter “Olwell”]. 
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should be imposed on a defendant unless it can be shown that the 
defendant’s culpable conduct violated a primary right held by the 
plaintiff. To be sure, in remedying rights-violations injured plaintiffs are 
normally compensated. But according to the Rights Model such awards 
are best thought of as vindicating rights, rather than compensating for 
losses. That is, according to the Rights Model the purpose of such awards 
is to make it as if the wrong — that is, the violation of the primary 
right — had never occurred. 
III. DISCUSSION 
At the outset I indicated that part of my goal was to argue that the 
Rights Model is preferable to the CCL Model, and by extension, to the 
Standard View, as an account of the basis of liability in the law of torts. 
And I said that the reason why it is preferable is that it is simpler, more 
coherent, and fits better with the cases. Let me now try to make good on 
these claims.  
Consider first the claim that the Rights Model is more coherent than 
the Standard View. This claim is, it seems to me, obvious. First, the 
Rights Model offers a unified explanation of liability in the law of torts, 
based on a plausible principle: no liability should be imposed on a 
defendant unless it can be shown that the defendant’s culpable conduct 
violated a primary right held by the plaintiff, and good against the 
defendant. This explanation applies to both the intentional torts and the 
harm-based torts. The Standard View, on the other hand, is explicit in 
proposing two accounts of liability, one that (in its view) is appropriate 
for the intentional torts and another that is appropriate for the harm-based 
torts.  
But there is another measure of coherence worth considering. 
According to this measure, “a coherent theory must be able to fit the 
doctrine to be explained with the larger area of the law in which, by 
common definition and practice, it is seen to reside”.35 On this measure 
the Standard View also fares poorly. This is because the Standard View 
results in a lack of fit between different areas of private law. Consider 
again Bradford. From the perspective of the orthodox law of property, 
the town of Bradford had no primary right to the percolating water that 
flowed downhill to the town. But if the Standard View’s analysis of that 
                                                                                                                                  
35  Jason Neyers, “A Coherent Law of Estoppel?” (2003) 2 J. Obligations & Remedies 25, at 27. 
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case is adopted, it follows that from the perspective of the law of 
obligations the town of Bradford did have a primary right to the water 
(given that Pickles’ intentional diversion of the water caused loss to the 
town). Now, there is nothing wrong with the law of property saying one 
thing and the law of obligations saying something else. The problem, 
rather, is that the Standard View implies that the reason why, in diverting 
the flow of water, Pickles wronged the Town of Bradford was because 
the town was entitled to continue to receive the water. But this claim only 
makes sense if it is interpreted in a proprietary manner. Thus, the 
Standard View implies that the town of Bradford both had, and did not 
have, a proprietary right to the percolating water. This incoherence is 
another strike against the Standard View.  
The Rights Model also fares better when we consider issues having 
to do with simplicity. In this context, simplicity has both a practical and a 
theoretical dimension. The idea that liability ought to be based on 
interferences with primary rights rather than on the culpable causation of 
loss is theoretically simpler for the same reasons that it is theoretically 
more coherent: it is based on a single unifying account of liability rather 
than on the union of two contrasting ones. Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, from a practical point of view the Rights Model is also 
simpler than the Standard View. To see why, consider the situation of a 
trial judge faced with questions of liability in the law of negligence. The 
Rights Model says that the first thing he or she must ask him- or herself 
is whether the defendant’s conduct interfered with a legally recognized 
primary right held by the plaintiff. If no such right can be identified, or if 
the defendant’s objectionable conduct did not, in fact, constitute a 
violation of that right, the negligence inquiry ends. The Standard View, 
on the other hand, proposes that liability in negligence ought to be based 
on the idea that “the defendant should be liable where he is at fault for 
causing the claimant loss unless there is a good reason why not”.36 But as 
a matter of fact the “reasons why not” are so varied and open-ended as to 
be practically useless. Since in principle any consideration could be 
relevant to the question whether liability ought to be imposed, the CCL 
Model entails that the negligence inquiry is unbounded and open-
ended.
37
 But then as a practical matter where are judges supposed to 
begin their inquiry? And where should they end it? The answer is not 
 
                                                                                                                                  
36  Stevens, Torts and Rights, supra, note 1, at 1. 
37  For similar complaints see again Stevens, Torts and Rights, id. 
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clear. In short, when considering the practical problems and questions 
confronting lawyers and judges in the law of torts the Rights Model can also 
be seen to be simpler than the Standard View, and ought to be preferred to it. 
So much for coherence and simplicity. Still, saying that the Rights 
Model is simpler and more coherent than the Standard View is not yet to 
say that it offers a better account of liability than the Standard View. For 
the Standard View might, quite simply, get the law right; and the Rights 
Model might simply get the law wrong. So let me turn now to discussion 
of my claim that the Rights Model fits the cases better than does the 
Standard View. To do so, I will begin with some exceedingly brief remarks 
about legal history before turning to a more theoretical discussion. 
1.  History 
The idea that that no liability should be imposed on a defendant 
unless it can be shown that the defendant’s conduct violated a primary 
right held by the plaintiff was, for a long time, a staple of Canadian law. 
Many early cases stand for the proposition that in the absence of a legal 
wrong, no liability will lie even where the defendant’s actions caused 
damage to the plaintiff or to her property.  
For example, in the 1898 case of Perrault v. Gauthier, the plaintiff, a 
stone-cutter, alleged that the defendants, who were officers of a legally 
recognized stone cutter’s union, had conspired against him to prevent 
him from gainfully pursuing his trade. The plaintiff had found work at a 
stone-yard. However, when his unionized co-workers learned that he was 
a member of an opposition union they promptly left work “without 
saying a word”. As a result, the plaintiff was required to quit his job at 
the stone-yard to prevent his employers (one of which was his brother) 
from losing money, and was unable to find work as a stone-cutter going 
forward. In finding for the defendants the Supreme Court of Canada 
endorsed the view that “one who acts within the limits of his rights 
commits no fault, that is legal fault, and is not liable in damages.”38 
Indeed, Girouard J. went so far as to say that this view “simply 
enunciates an elementary maxim of universal or natural law adopted by 
all civilized nations …”.39 It therefore concluded that the defendants 
were not liable for the plaintiff’s losses.  
                                                                                                                                  
38  Perrault v. Gauthier, [1898] S.C.J. No. 1, 28 S.C.R. 241, at 253 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Perrault”], relying heavily on Allan v. Flood, [1898] A.C. 1 (H.L.). 
39  Perrault v. Gauthier, id., at 254. 
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Similarly, in the 1915 case of Hamilton Street Railway Co. v. Weir,
40
 
the defendants had been hired to erect and maintain trolley poles and 
wires pursuant to a contract with the city of Hamilton. The plaintiff, who 
was driving his car along King Street in Hamilton, collided with a pole 
supporting some trolley wires belonging to the defendants. As a result, 
the plaintiff’s automobile was damaged and the plaintiff himself was 
injured. He sued the defendants, who were responsible for erecting and 
maintaining the poles and wires pursuant to a contract with the City of 
Hamilton. In finding for the defendants Duff J. said that “[t]he precise 
thing that was done was authorized by the legislature. It, therefore, could 
not be a nuisance in contemplation of law. If harm arises from the 
placing of poles where the legislature directs they shall be put, such 
harm, as Lord Blackburn said, is damnum absque injuria.”41  
In other words, it was always the position of the law that there will 
be no liability for loss if the damage was caused by the defendant acting 
within or in the exercise of his or her legal rights, but that liability will 
arise only where the damage was the result of the defendant’s 
interference with the legal rights of another. Or in the terminology of the 
present paper, it has always been the case that there can be no liability 
unless the loss complained of was consequential on the defendant’s 
violation of a primary right held by the plaintiff. This is simply another 
way of stating the Rights Model’s general account of liability.  
2.  Eclipse 
At some point in the recent past, however, the account of liability 
championed by Rights Model was eclipsed by the model of liability 
characteristic of the Standard View. Although it is difficult to say why or 
when this happened, it seems plausible to suppose that this was due in no 
small part to the emphasis placed on considerations of policy in the law 
of negligence in particular.
42
 Moreover, it is also arguable that this has 
been a detrimental development for the law of torts. As Nicholas 
McBride argues, the CCL Model: 
                                                                                                                                  
40  [1915] S.C.J. No. 30, 51 S.C.R. 506 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hamilton Street”]. 
41  Id., at 514 (S.C.C.). For similar pronouncements, see also Pion v. North Shore Railway 
Co., [1887] S.C.J. No. 30, 14 S.C.R. 677 (S.C.C.) and  Toronto (City) v. J.F. Brown Co., [1917] 
S.C.J. No. 19, 55 S.C.R. 153 (S.C.C.). 
42  See Weinrib, “The Disintegration of Duty”, c. 2 of Corrective Justice, supra, note 16. 
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… creates the impression that judges in tort cases are simply concerned 
to determine whether it would be “fair, just and reasonable” to allow 
the plaintiff to sue the defendant for compensation for a loss that the 
plaintiff has suffered. [It] also creates a danger that judges will begin to 
buy into this myth of what happens in tort law cases and start 
arrogating to themselves powers to redistribute losses as they see fit, 
according to their own private notions of what is “fair, just and 
reasonable”.43  
The nature of this eclipse can be seen most clearly by considering 
some economic loss cases where the focus on primary rights was largely 
replaced by considerations having to do with compensation and the 
culpable causation of loss.  
I will begin with Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific 
Steamship Co.
44
 In Norsk a barge being towed down the Fraser River by 
the defendant, Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., collided with a bridge 
owned by Public Works Canada (“PWC”), and used by, among others, 
the plaintiff Canadian National Railway Co. (“CN”). CN had a contract 
with PWC that excluded PWC from liability for lost profits due to 
damage to the bridge. As a result of the collision the bridge had to be 
temporarily closed down for repairs, and as a result, CN suffered a 
decline in its profits. PWC repaired the bridge and recovered the costs of 
its repairs from Norsk at trial; CN, which was precluded from recovering 
in contract, sued Norsk in tort. The issue before the Courts was therefore 
whether Norsk was liable for the relational economic loss suffered by CN 
and caused by Norsk’s negligence in damaging PWC’s bridge.45  
On the Rights Model, a suit for pure economic loss should be treated 
no differently from any other action in negligence. The key issue is 
whether the plaintiff had a primary right, good against the defendant, to 
be protected from the loss that occurred as a result of the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                                  
43  See the discussion in Nicholas McBride, “Rights and the Basis of Tort Law” in D. Nolan 
& A. Robertson, eds., Rights and Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 331, at 334. 
44  Norsk, supra, note 6. I realize that Norsk has been largely overtaken by Bow Valley 
Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] S.C.J. No. 111, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210 
(S.C.C.). Nonetheless, because it is such a clear application of the CCL Model it remains a useful 
case to think about. I will return to discuss Bow Valley Husky below. 
45  The law typically distinguishes between three kinds of economic loss: consequential 
economic loss, i.e., loss that follows from the plaintiff suffering personal injury or damage to his or 
her property; pure economic loss, i.e., loss that is not related to personal injury or property damage 
either to the plaintiff or to a third party; and relational economic loss, i.e., loss that is caused by damage 
to a third party’s person or property. Thus, although framed as a case involving pure economic loss, 
the issue in Norsk ultimately concerned relational economic loss in the above sense, given that 
Norsk’s negligence damaged the property not of the plaintiff CN, but of a third party (PWC).  
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negligence. In cases of negligently inflicted consequential economic loss 
— economic loss that is the consequence of a violation of a personal or 
proprietary right — the answer is relatively straightforward. Since, in 
such cases, the defendant has wrongfully interfered with a primary right 
to his or her body, or to his or her property, there is no question that the 
defendant is liable for losses that are consequences of the interference. 
The secondary right that arises when the primary right is violated is an 
entitlement to make it as if the (primary) wrong had not occurred; and to 
do that the defendant must not only repair the damaged limb or property, 
but also compensate the plaintiff for any reasonable losses suffered as a 
result of, i.e., consequential upon, that damage.
46
  
In cases of pure or relational economic loss, on the other hand, it is 
less clear that liability ought to be imposed; and indeed, in such cases the 
law adopts a general exclusionary rule. What justifies such a rule? The 
Rights Model has an answer. In cases of pure or relational economic loss 
a general exclusionary rule is imposed because in such cases there is 
typically nothing to which the plaintiff can point and say, as against the 
defendant, you had no right to interfere with that thing. In Norsk, for 
example, while CN had a contract with PWC to use the bridge, and so 
had an in personam right good against PWC, that right was only in 
personam, that is, was good only against PWC; it did not bind Norsk. 
With respect to Norsk, in other words, CN could assert no primary right 
to the bridge. To be sure, as against PWC — the owner of the bridge — 
the defendant Norsk acted badly, and was therefore liable for the costs of 
repair. But CN’s contractual relationship with PWC was not relevant to 
Norsk’s obligations to CN in tort. 
The problem, of course, is that this was not the conclusion reached 
by the Supreme Court. I will focus in particular on the reasons of 
McLachlin J.  (as she then was). In her view relational economic loss is 
simply another form of loss. Consequently, she reasoned that because it 
was foreseeable that Norsk’s negligence in damaging PWC’s bridge 
could result in harm or loss to CN there was a prima facie case for 
imposing liability on Norsk. The only issue was whether there were any 
reasons not to impose liability, that is, whether recovery was desirable 
                                                                                                                                  
46  For insightful discussions of these issues see Peter Benson, “The Basis for Excluding 
Economic Loss in Tort Law” in D. Owen, ed., Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), at 427 and Peter Benson, “The Problem with Pure Economic Loss” 
(2009) 60 S.C.L. Rev. 823. 
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from a practical point of view.
47
 Justice McLachlin canvassed a number 
of considerations that might be thought to negate liability but eventually 
reached the conclusion that because CN’s operations were so closely 
allied to the operation of PWC’s bridge, it was as if CN and PWC were 
engaged in a joint venture. And since the joint venture principle had 
previously allowed for the recovery of economic loss in maritime cases, 
it followed that CN’s economic loss was recoverable in tort from the 
defendant Norsk notwithstanding the fact that no primary right had been 
identified. Norsk is therefore a textbook application of the CCL Model: 
objectionable conduct together with the foreseeable causation of loss 
entails liability, subject to exceptions.  
A similar conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in another economic loss case, Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. 
Bird Construction Co.
48
 Simplifying somewhat, the facts are as follows. 
In 1972 a land developer contracted with the defendant construction 
company to build an apartment building. The building was completed in 
1974. It was eventually converted into a condominium, and in 1978 the 
land developer sold the land and the building to the plaintiff corporation. 
The plaintiff’s directors subsequently became concerned about the 
masonry work on the outside of the building and in 1989 a storey-high 
section of the exterior cladding fell from the building to the ground. 
Further inspection revealed structural defects in the masonry work, and 
the entire exterior cladding was eventually replaced at the owner’s 
expense. This was considered an economic loss case, rather than a 
straightforward negligence case, because the defendant’s negligence had 
not resulted in physical damage to person or property. Rather, what the 
plaintiff sought to recover were the costs of returning the negligently 
constructed building to a non-dangerous state.  
The issue at the Supreme Court was therefore whether a builder 
responsible for the construction of a building may be held liable in 
negligence to a subsequent purchaser of the building, who is not in 
contractual privity with the builder, for the cost of repairing defects in the 
building arising out of negligent construction; the Court answered this 
question in the affirmative. In its view, builders “will owe a duty in tort 
[negligence] to subsequent purchasers of the building if it can be shown 
that it was foreseeable that a failure to take reasonable care in 
constructing the building would create defects that pose a substantial 
                                                                                                                                  
47  Norsk, supra, note 6, at 1160. 
48  [1995] S.C.J. No. 2, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Winnipeg Condominium”]. 
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danger to the health and safety of the occupants”.49 Moreover, even 
where such defects are discovered before any damage to person or 
property occurs, builders “should … be liable for the reasonable cost of 
repairing the defects and putting the building back into a non-dangerous 
state”.50  
In Winnipeg Condominium the Supreme Court applied the so-called 
two-stage Anns test for the duty of care.
51
 According to this test, in order 
to determine whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care a 
Court must determine, first, whether there is a relationship of proximity 
between the parties sufficient to give rise to a prima facie duty of care on 
the part of the defendant. If the Court is satisfied that sufficient proximity 
exists, it must then consider whether there are any policy factors that 
might negative the imposition of a duty of care. It should be clear that 
this is just the CCL Model applied to the duty of care analysis: the 
defendant should be subject to a duty of care where loss is foreseeable 
unless there is a good reason why not. It should also be clear that the 
crux of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Winnipeg Condominium was 
based primarily on considerations having to do with harm or loss, or 
better, with the likelihood of harm or loss. What was central to the 
Court’s decision was the fact that due to the defendant’s negligence, the 
condominium building constituted “a substantial danger to the health and 
safety of the occupants”,52 to say nothing of passersby. It was the likelihood 
of physical harm to others that led the plaintiff to repair the exterior 
cladding, and triggered the plaintiff’s financial loss due to the costs of the 
repairs. Because this was a loss that was a foreseeable consequence of 
the defendant’s negligence the Supreme Court was of the view that the 
defendant was under a duty to compensate the plaintiff for its financial 
loss. Consequently, it would appear that Winnipeg Condominium is also 
best understood as an instance of the CCL Model of liability. 
3.  Reinterpreting the Standard View in Light of the Rights Model 
But even if the Standard View — and with it, the CCL Model of 
liability for the harm-based torts — has recently been on the rise, it 
seems to me that the Standard View can only succeed if, in fact, it helps 
                                                                                                                                  
49  Id., at para. 43. 
50  Id. 
51  Taken from Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.). 
52  Winnipeg Condominium, supra, note 48, at para. 43. 
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itself to the very sorts of concepts that it is at pains to distance itself 
from. By this I mean that an argument can be made that the Standard 
View must inevitably appeal, if only implicitly, to primary and secondary 
rights in order to reach plausible conclusions regarding liability. 
However, if this is right, then it turns out that the promise of the Standard 
View to make sense of the harm-based torts using the CCL Model of 
liability is largely illusory, since the CCL Model is neither as simple nor 
as coherent as the Rights Model, and only makes sense if we assume that 
the Rights Model is operating in the background.  
To understand what I have in mind, let us return to Norsk and 
Winnipeg Condominium, cases that I have suggested are paradigmatic 
examples of the CCL Model of liability for harm-based torts. Consider in 
the first instance Norsk. As noted above, in Norsk McLachlin J. 
concluded that because CN and PWC were in a contractual relationship 
with respect to the use of PWC’s bridge, and because CN’s use of PWC’s 
bridge was ongoing and significant — indeed, McLachlin J. took note of the 
fact that the bridge was colloquially referred to as “the CN bridge” — it 
was as if CN and PWC were engaged in a joint enterprise. As she put it,  
… where the plaintiff’s operations are so closely allied to the 
operations of the party suffering physical damage and to its property 
(which — as damaged — causes the plaintiff’s loss) that it can be 
considered a joint venturer with the owner of the property, the plaintiff 
can recover its economic loss even though the plaintiff has suffered no 
physical damage to its own property. To deny recovery in such 
circumstances would be to deny it to a person who for practical 




To be sure, it is possible to quibble about the details of this argument. 
For example, there is ample reason to doubt (as La Forest J. did) whether, 
in fact, CN and PWC were in a relationship of sufficient proximity to 
make it plausible that they were engaged in what amounted to a joint 
venture. But let us set this issue to one side and ask instead: why is it 
relevant to Norsk’s liability to CN that the business affairs of PWC and 
CN were so intimately linked that it made sense to treat them as if they 
were engaged in a joint enterprise? What, in other words, is the legal 
significance of this conclusion? The answer, surely, is that had CN and 
PWC been in a joint venture, then CN would have enjoyed the same 
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primary rights with respect to the bridge as those enjoyed by the true 
owner, PWC. In other words, the determination that CN was part of a 
joint venture with PWC would serve to indicate that Norsk’s liability was 
being based on the identification of a primary right held by CN, as the 
Rights Model requires. So in arguing for liability based on a joint 
venture, McLachlin J. was in effect arguing that without the 
identification of a primary right exigible against the defendant, the 
plaintiff could not succeed. 
In Norsk McLachlin J. asked, rhetorically, why the right to recover 
economic loss should: 
… be dependent on whether physical damage, however minuscule, had 
been inflicted on the plaintiff’s property?  Why should a plaintiff who 
waits for a defective machine to break and cause physical injury or 
damage be able to recover, while one who prudently repairs the 




An answer is not far to find: while physical damage, however 
minuscule, typically indicates that the defendant’s conduct has interfered 
with the plaintiff’s primary right to be free from bodily harm or harm to 
property, there is in general no right outside of any contractual agreement 
to have in one’s possession machines that are free from defect. In other 
words, the law historically, and quite plausibly, denied recovery to a 
plaintiff  “who waits for a defective machine to break and cause physical 
injury or damage” because until damage occurs it is not clear that any 
primary right of the plaintiff has been violated. 
With this in mind, consider again Winnipeg Condominium. The 
problem in Winnipeg Condominium, recall, was that it was not clear that 
the careless actions of the defendants in constructing a defective building 
violated any legal right held by the plaintiffs. Because the plaintiffs, who 
owned the defective condominium building, had no contractual 
relationship with the builders, they could not sue in contract. But neither 
was it clear that the defendants’ construction of the building interfered 
with any primary right held by the plaintiffs given that there is in general 
no right to purchase or own non-defective goods. The plaintiffs wished to 
recover damages for the cost of putting the condominium building into a 
non-defective and non-dangerous condition — but the question remains: 
on what legal basis could this recovery be based?  
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I want to suggest that in reaching its conclusion the Court was in fact 
attempting to identify the nature and boundary of the plaintiffs’ legal 
rights and entitlements. First, consider La Forest J.’s claim that from the 
point of view of the law of negligence residences are in an important 
sense different from ordinary chattels. In Murphy v. Brentwood District 
Council,
55
 Lord Keith of Kinkel argued that the cost of repairing a 
defective article or object cannot be viewed as a legally recoverable 
expense because the owner of the article has other options; the owner 
can, for example, simply discard it. In response La Forest J. said the 
following: 
The weakness of the argument is that it is based upon an unrealistic 
view of the choice faced by home owners in deciding whether to repair 
a dangerous defect in their home. In fact, a choice to “discard” a home 
instead of repairing the dangerous defect is no choice at all: most home 
owners buy a home as a long term investment and few home owners, 
upon discovering a dangerous defect in the home, will choose to 
abandon or sell the building rather than to repair the defect. Indeed, in 
most cases, the cost of fixing a defect in a house or building, within the 
reasonable life of that house or building, will be far outweighed by the 
cost of replacing the house or buying a new one.
56
   
Although La Forest J.’s conclusion appears to be based on a cost-
benefit calculation — because it is more efficient for homeowners to 
repair latent defects than to abandon or sell their property, the law ought 
to encourage that outcome by imposing liability on defendants who 
negligently create such defects — another possibility suggests itself. 
And that is the idea that, precisely because it would be unfair or 
unrealistic to require homeowners to mitigate their loss by abandoning or 
selling their homes, homeowners have a right not to be required to 
engage in that sort of behaviour. Once such a right is recognized, 
however, it follows that a negligent defendant should be precluded from 
relying on the possibility of abandonment or sale in order to avoid 
liability in tort. In other words, an alternative interpretation of La Forest 
J.’s argument is that homeowners have a right to repair latent defects and 
to be compensated for the costs of doing so, and that it is this right that 
the Court in Winnipeg Condominium is seeking to protect.
57
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A parallel with cases of wrongful birth is suggestive. When due to a 
physician’s negligence a woman becomes pregnant she will sometimes 
sue the physician in tort for the added costs of caring for and raising her 
child. But it will not do for the physician to argue that having carried the 
fetus to term the woman should be responsible for the cost of caring for 
her child since another choice was always open to her, viz., to have an 
abortion. That may be a factual choice that was available to her; but the 
law says that that is not a choice that it would be reasonable or fair to 
expect or require her to make.
58
 Consequently, the law concludes that the 
woman has a right to continue the pregnancy, while also being entitled to 
sue the negligent physician for damages.
59
 
Second, consider the issue about defects and dangerousness. The 
problem was not simply that the condominium building in Winnipeg 
Condominium was defective. Rather, the problem was that it was 
virtually inevitable that if nothing was done the defective nature of the 
building would manifest itself in physical injury to persons. Justice La 
Forest stated: 
In my view, the reasonable likelihood that a defect in a building will 
cause injury to its inhabitants is also sufficient to ground a contractor’s 
duty in tort to subsequent purchasers of the building for the cost of 
repairing the defect if that defect is discovered prior to any injury and if 
it poses a real and substantial danger to the inhabitants of the building. 
… If a contractor can be held liable in tort where he or she constructs a 
building negligently and, as a result of that negligence, the building 
causes damage to persons or property, it follows that the contractor 
should also be held liable in cases where the dangerous defect is 
discovered and the owner of the building wishes to mitigate the danger 
by fixing the defect and putting the building back into a non-dangerous 
state. In both cases, the duty in tort serves to protect the bodily integrity 
and property interests of the inhabitants of the building.
60
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To be sure, there is room to criticize this argument. For example, it 
might be objected that the fact that third parties — be they residents or 
passersby — might be injured by the plaintiff’s defective building only 
gives those third parties a right to sue the defendants. Or it might be 
objected that until the defective nature of the building actually manifests 
itself in physical injury to persons there can be no negligence, since there is 
no harm to redress. But the point I want to make is that in this passage La 
Forest J. is doing precisely what the Rights Model says judges should do 
when attempting to determine the scope of a defendant’s liability, viz., 
identifying a primary right held by the plaintiff, and exigible against the 
defendant, that the defendant’s objectionable conduct can be said to 
interfere with. And surely the right to bodily integrity is such a right. 
In short, my claim is that initial appearances to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the CCL Model cannot in fact account for the basis of 
liability in harm-based torts such as negligence and nuisance without 
incorporating into its analysis something very much like the concept of a 
primary right. This is because, notwithstanding the CCL’s focus on the 
culpable causation of loss, the arguments for why certain harms or losses 
ought to be subject to compensation must inevitably appeal to 
considerations having to do with rights and entitlements. In the case of 
Norsk, this involved an argument for the conclusion that CN and PWC 
were in a joint endeavour with respect to the bridge; in the case of 
Winnipeg Condominium it involved the claim that the negligent 
construction of the exterior cladding carried with it a risk of significant 
bodily harm to residents and passersby, coupled with the implicit 
assumption that individuals have a right to be free from such risks.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have distinguished two models of tort liability, the 
Standard View — which is based in part on what I have called the CCL 
Model of liability — and the Rights Model. And I have argued that the 
Rights Model is to be preferred as an account of liability in the law of 
torts on the grounds that it is simpler and more coherent than the 
Standard View, which embraces two distinct models of liability, and 
because it makes better sense of the cases. This has consequences for 
how one approaches the concepts of compensation and loss in the 
analysis of liability in the law of torts. According to the CCL Model of 
liability for the harm-based torts, whenever a defendant is responsible for 
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causing loss or damage to a plaintiff, liability ought to be imposed unless 
there are good reasons not to do so. The default, in other words, is 
liability subject to exceptions. According to the Rights Model, on the 
other hand, even where damage is caused liability ought to be imposed 
only when the defendant’s actions wrongfully interfered with a legally 
protected interest, or primary right, held by the plaintiff. The default, in 
other words, is no liability without the violation of a primary right. I have 
argued that the law of torts can be seen to be a normatively coherent 
enterprise only if the Rights Model is adopted both for those torts that are 
actionable per se, as well as for those torts that require proof of harm. 
The law of torts seeks to insulate individuals from wrongful interferences 
with their primary rights to bodily integrity, bodily autonomy, and 
property, and it does so in the first instance by seeking to protect and 
vindicate rights. It does not do so by compensating for harm culpably 
caused. 
What, if anything, does this tell us about the law of torts going 
forward? If the argument of the present paper is correct and the Standard 
View in fact presupposes the very concepts and distinctions characteristic 
of the Rights Model, then we should expect the law of torts to return to 
the sort of reasoning exemplified by cases like Perrault
61
 and Hamilton 
Street,
62
 where the focus was squarely on the question whether the 
defendant’s conduct interfered with any legally protected interest of or 
primary right held by the plaintiff. By way of illustration, take, for 
example, Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding 
Ltd.
63
 In Bow Valley Husky the Supreme Court of Canada had an 
opportunity to revisit its decision in Norsk. While the facts in Bow Valley 
Husky are somewhat complicated, at bottom they involved a fire on an 
oil-drilling rig. Husky Oil Operations Ltd. (“HOOL”) and Bow Valley 
Industries Ltd. (“BVI”) arranged to have an oil-drilling rig constructed 
by Saint John Ship Building (“SJSB”). In order to benefit from 
government funding, however, HOOL and BVI decided that they would 
form a separate company, Bow Valley Husky Bermuda (“BVHB”). The 
contract with SJSB was subsequently transferred to BVHB and BVHB 
became the owner of the rig. A heat trace system was required in order to 
prevent the rig’s pipes from freezing during the winter, and BVHB 
wanted to use an anti-pipe freezing system manufactured by Raychem; 
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unfortunately, this system became flammable under certain conditions, 
and both SJSB and Raychem failed to warn the BVHB about this 
possibility. HOOL and BVI maintained a contract with BVHB for the 
hire of the rig and for day rates paid if the rig was out of service. When a 
fire broke out because of the improper use of the pipe system substantial 
damages occurred and the rig had to be towed into harbour in order for 
repairs to be carried out. HOOL and BVI sought to recover from SJSB 
the day rates that they were contractually bound to pay BVHB during the 
period that the rig was out of service, together with other expenses 
incurred due to the fire. 
While the litigation in Bow Valley Husky involved a number of issues 
(including questions having to do with the existence of a duty to warn, 
causation and contributory negligence) what interests me is the Court’s 
treatment of the economic loss argument. This issue arose because 
HOOL and BVI were seeking to recover losses they suffered as a result 
of damage to the property of a third party, namely BVHB. In discussing 
this issue McLachlin J. (as she then was) said that “[t]he plaintiffs 
[HOOL and BVI] here had no possessory or proprietary interest in the rig 
and the case is not one of general averaging. While related contractually, 
the Court of Appeal correctly held that the plaintiff and the property 
owner cannot, on any view of the term, be viewed as joint venturers.”64 
This is significant in light of Norsk. This is because the Court in Bow 
Valley Husky is clearly relying on the idea that damages in economic loss 
will flow only if the defendant’s objectionable conduct interfered with a 
primary right held by the plaintiff. But according to McLachlin J. the 
plaintiffs HOOL and BVI had no property right in the oil-drilling rig — 
the rig was entirely owned by BVHB — nor was there any reason to 
suppose that the plaintiffs were in a joint venture with BVHB. 
Consequently, it followed that no primary right of the plaintiff was 
interfered with by the defendant’s negligence.65 As indicated above, this 
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is a perfectly respectable way to approach issues involving economic loss 
and is exactly what we would expect to find if Courts were working with 
an account of liability that presupposes the basic commitments 
characteristic of the Rights Model. 
It is impossible in a paper such as this to canvass every form of 
liability in the law of torts, or to analyze every negligence case, and that 
has not been my goal. Rather, I have been concerned to argue quite 
generally that as an account of the nature of liability in the law of torts 
the Rights Model deserves to be taken seriously. Moreover, it is in a 
sense the only model of liability in the law of torts that makes sense. 
Basing liability on considerations of culpable causation of loss alone 
results in a law of torts that is often uncertain, needlessly complex and 
theoretically incoherent. It has long been a bedrock principle of the law 
of torts — an “elementary maxim of universal or natural law adopted by 
all civilized nations”66 — that liability will arise only where the damages 
resulted from the defendant’s interference with the legally protected 
interests of another. Or in the terminology of the present paper, it has 
always been the case that there can be no tortious liability for loss if the 
damage was not consequential on the defendant’s violation of a primary 
right held by the plaintiff. As I have argued, this was traditionally the 
position taken by Canadian Courts in respect of the law of torts, and I am 
hopeful that it will be again. 
 
                                                                                                             
a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive 
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time 
to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to 
enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these 
consequences.” (Ultramares, supra, note 13, at 444.) In brief, Cardozo J.’s point was not that, 
having recognized on the basis of foreseeability and proximity a prima facie duty of care, 
considerations of indeterminate liability constitute policy reasons for negating that duty. Instead, his 
point was that the spectre of indeterminate liability reveals that the very idea that there could be a 
duty of care is conceptually incoherent. The issue for Cardozo J. was therefore one of principle, not 
of policy. If it is impossible ex ante to determine what the ambit of the risk is, or to say with 
reasonable certainty who falls within the range of apprehension associated with a particular form of 
conduct, it follows that there can be no duty of care not to engage in that conduct. 
66  Perrault, supra, note 38, at 254 (S.C.C.). 
 
